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The aim of this paper is to analyse some macroeconomic channels operating in a war economy.
At the theoretical level, the effects of such war on the key economic variables capital,
technology, uncertainty, and the government’s fiscal deficit are discussed before proceeding to
the analysis of individuals, firms and the government. These elements are combined in a
dynamic macroeconomic model to study a war’s impact on output, growth, consumption,
welfare and the national debt. The final section of this paper considers economic policy
implications for a government at war, and for donors supporting a war economy. Both the
theory and the evidence, drawn from Mozambique, suggest that while capital destruction is the
most obvious cost of conflict the long-term development potential of a war economy is more
severely damaged by increases in the fiscal deficit, uncertainty and transactions inefficiency.
Furthermore, economic policies implemented during a war will determine the size and nature of
the country’s long-term peace dividend.
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1.  Introduction
Frequently, the analysis of Mozambique’s recent economic development is interpreted
either without adequate reference to the effects of war, or the effects of war are not
fully understood. The former view is often implicitly adopted by the IMF and the
World Bank, who frequently call for a reduction in government activity which may
well be counterproductive under conditions of war. The latter position considers war
as an emergency with most impact on the social infrastructure, requiring only short
term policy responses. This is correct on humanitarian grounds but neglects the
development implication of war. The analysis presented here emphasises the role of
the war for the Mozambican economy and therefore complements the existing
literature on its recent economic history.
This paper will proceed by analysing the impact of war on the key economic variables
capital, technology, uncertainty, and the government’s fiscal deficit and the three main
actors in the war economy, namely individuals, firms and the government. These
elements are combined in a dynamic macroeconomic model to study the war’s impact
on output, growth, consumption, welfare and the national debt both theoretically and
for the case of Mozambique, 1974-1995. The final section of this paper considers some
economic policy implications for a government at war, and for donors supporting a
war economy such as Mozambique.
2.  The War in Mozambique
The level of development in colonial Mozambique was low even by African standards
and despite a burst of industrial growth induced by the Portuguese regime in the
1950s.1 By 1970, total GDP was estimated at US$ 1.25 billion, that is US$ 132 per capita
at current prices (Ratilal, tables 1 and 4, 1990). This compares with an estimate of US$
196 per capita in 1980 and US$ 115 per capita in 1990 at current prices (table A.2
below). In addition to a harsh political regime, the economy started to endure the
                    
1 For an account of colonial Mozambican history, see Newitt (1995), while Hall and
Young (1997) cover more recent events. Different perspectives to Mozambique’s
economic history include Hermele (1988), Brochmann and Ofstad (1990),
Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1994), Castel-Branco (1994), Hanlon (1991 and 1996), and
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effects of war as early as 1964, when the Mozambican war of independence
commenced. It was shaped by partial and slow successes of the Frelimo liberation
army against the Portuguese fascist forces. The liberation war was an internal war
carried out with conventional methods by the colonial army and guerrilla methods by
the Mozambican rebels.
The Portuguese revolution of April 1974 led to an ill-planned decolonisation process,
with much confusion and misunderstanding on both sides. After a time of relative
peace and stability in the early years of independence, an internal, or civil, war
commenced in various rural parts of Mozambique with varying degrees of intensity,
and with a much stronger impact on the countryside than on the towns. After
Zimbabwean independence of 1980, the war intensified, continuing in all parts of the
country, including in the South around the capital Maputo. 1981 may hence be seen as
the start of a new, intense phase of fighting. Mozambique joined the IMF and the
World Bank in September 1984 thus starting a programme of stabilisation, structural
adjustment and trade liberalisation, which reversed many of its former socialist
policies well before the end of the cold war. Formally, the war ended when the
successful peace agreement between the government and the Renamo rebels was
signed in late 1992 after surprisingly successful, secret negotiations.
To understand the economic processes occurring in a war economy such as
Mozambique’s, one must first understand the meaning of war itself. An economic
shock is a sudden and substantial disequilibrium in a socio-economic system induced
by an exogenous event. A terms of trade shock, for instance, suddenly disturbs the
relative price of exportable versus importable goods. However, the changes in world
prices and hence in the terms of trade do not occur in isolation: They can be induced
by changes in the natural environment (e.g. by a natural disaster), constraints (e.g. a
resource discovery) or preferences (e.g. of the government). War resembles many of
these aspects of a terms of trade shock as war will be affected by all three variables and
will have its main direct effects in one sector (e.g. the rural sector), yet the main effects
of war do not operate on prices directly.
Natural disasters, which share with wars their well defined geographical limits, may
vary in duration (an earthquake may be over in a matter of minutes, a drought mayQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 4
last several years), yet they can be expected to be only of temporary duration (except
for exogenous climatic changes). A distinction between short- and long-lasting natural
disasters is their impact: The former is likely to have strong direct effects while the
latter may cause relatively intense effects in an indirect way over the long-term,
possibly cumulating in sudden outbursts of further disaster such as famine or
epidemics (Albala-Bertrand, 1993). Analogous considerations will shape the economic
characterisation of war.
Conflicts are fundamental disagreements between two groups involving competing
claims over the legal authority over some asset or territory and various methods and
instruments for communicating and perhaps resolving this difference. Political
conflicts characterise all societies and are the focus of much economic analysis. Violent
conflicts involve the use of force in communicating and resolving the disagreement,
where the type of force applied changes the nature of the violent conflict. In the
extreme such conflict risks wide-spread and lethal use of force and the inherent and
perhaps deliberate challenge of the opponent’s authority. This is called war.
The analysis of war as a shock to an economic system crucially depends on the type of
war under analysis.2 Some wars are fought only with the intention of weakening an
opponent rather than defeating them. Such wars of destabilisation will lead to large
scale capital and technological destruction and uncertainty. Internal wars of
destabilisation may require only very simple tools while their containment and
(international) wars of conquest will typically require more sophisticated weaponry
and organisation. In the case of Mozambique, it will be shown that both the aim of
destabilisation (and hence the challenge to the legitimacy of the country’s rulers) and
methods employed in the pursuit of this aim shaped the economic nature of the war,
namely larger than expected increases in capital destruction and the fiscal deficit as
well as uncertainty and transactions inefficiency.
Arguably, a war is not a permanent change in an economy. One of the main
implications of a temporary shock is that it will affect the savings behaviour of agents:
Given the expected increase in future income (or equivalently the almost constant
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permanent income), people will dis-save for the duration of the temporary negative
shock. For a permanent negative shock, however, permanent income unambiguously
declines and consumption levels adjust accordingly. Therefore, the distinction between
temporary and permanent shocks is crucial (Bevan et al, 1991). While at first a war may
be perceived to be temporary, many wars quickly turn into lengthy campaigns with a
highly uncertain outcome and time horizon, that is the war will become quasi-
permanent. If a war is considered a quasi-permanent shock soon after fighting started,
then agents’ behaviour and expectations will quickly adjust to this.3 The savings rate,
for instance, may not change for the duration of the shock and expectations may be
fully revised to reflect the new economic environment. Overall, this detailed definition
of war has indicated that war may be viewed as a complex but not incomprehensible
socio-economic shock, which differs significantly from trade shocks and natural
disasters. It has thus been shown that both the conduct of war and its implications are
more systematic if not rational than often assumed.
The post-1975 war in Mozambique was hence an internal war of destabilisation, using
conventional weapons, with in parts only very basic equipment. The intention of the
Renamo guerrilla (or their presumed Rhodesian/South African sponsors) was to lead a
low-intensity war of destabilisation, not a full internal war aimed at taking over the
administration of the country (Vines, 1991, Geffray, 1991, and Finnegan, 1992). The
diffuse intention of destabilisation through terror suggested that the war created much
confusion and volatility in the rural areas (particularly caused by Renamo) while the
towns suffered a regime unsuccessfully trying to rebut the rural attacks. This caused
an uneasy stalemate for over ten years without either side wanting or being able to
protect the targets (mainly people and social infrastructure) with the exception of those
in core urban areas. The government opted for an expensive, high-technological
strategy of warfare making unsuccessful use of its capital intensive tools (like the
colonial authority before) while Renamo used a very low-technology labour-intensive
strategy to achieve its military (and political) aim of destabilisation. The general
perception of the war was that would be quasi-permanently. The end of the war came
unexpected and was conditioned by external political changes, namely the end of the
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Cold War and the change of government in South Africa, which reduced the level of
intervention in Mozambique. However, the internal economic situation of both sides
in the conflict may have contributed to the end of the war as well, as will be analysed
below.
3.  Key Economic Aspects of the War Economy
This section of the paper defines a set of economic variables and relationships which
are directly affected by war shocks and which in turn shape the war economy. In
particular, the variables capital, transactions efficiency, uncertainty, and the fiscal
deficit will be defined and evaluated. Subsequently, household’s objective function
and the corresponding budget constraint, the production and investment behaviour of
the firm, as well as the government’s objective function and its budget constraint will
be examined in detail.
3.1  Capital4
The category “capital” embraces a broad group of economic variables. It includes
physical capital, human capital, and social capital. Physical capital includes assets such
as roads, powerlines, hospitals, schools, etc as well as financial assets, natural
resources and the environment. Human capital covers the number, skills and abilities of
people in the labour force. Social capital encompasses institutions such as legislative,
executive and legal systems as well as cultural and ethical values and attitudes. Hence
the first two terms refer to physical assets while social capital denotes a more abstract
concept. These three variables are denoted capital, labour and (transactions) efficiency
respectively in this paper. Transactions efficiency is distinguished separately below, as
it enables the use of capital and labour at lower transactions costs.
The most visible impact of war on an economy is on actual and desired capital stock.
There are three channels of impact namely erosion, destruction and reallocation.5
Erosion involves a loss of capital through its transformation to a lower value,
including the complete disappearance of the asset in the special case of destruction.
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5 For human capital, the terms erosion, destruction and reallocation correspond to the
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For physical assets such as a school the meanings of these two terms are obvious yet
both concepts can also be applied to abstract concepts such as law and order. Below a
certain threshold, capital may not be operational, thus requiring less than full
destruction to achieve complete economic destruction. Erosion and destruction involve
direct and indirect effects. The former would be the loss of value attributable to enemy
action while the latter includes externality effects. In addition, the economy-wide
externality of a private loss of capital due to war action increases transaction costs (see
below).
Reallocation relates to how agents anticipate or react to the effects of war on their
portfolio. The erosion or destruction of a part of a portfolio is followed by a
reallocation of capital assets, unless the net effect of the war impact was
equiproportionate. In addition, reallocation may be brought about in response to other
war variables changing, such as taxes or uncertainty. Given an ex ante optimal capital
allocation, a reallocation must reduce productivity vis-à-vis peace time. Overall,
reallocation may result in a reduction of both actual and desired capital stocks for a
given activity, firm or sector.
The easiest way of conceptualising the impact of war on various types of capital is by
analysing capital vulnerability. Note that war may affect the physical quantity of
actual or desired capital, the value of the capital stock or the returns to capital (as well
as the level of capacity utilisation of the firm which affects its efficiency of operation).
Several aspects of vulnerability (related to the characteristics of capital itself) can be
identified: Visibility, mobility, specificity, duration, and legality. Visibility makes an
asset more vulnerable to attack. Indirectly, agents may anticipate this vulnerability ex
ante and reallocate their capital into a less visible form. In addition, invisible assets are
preferred if they have been obtained illegally or their legal status is uncertain.
Mobility acts to increase capital’s vulnerability by making it more exposed to theft
(keeping the capital’s value unchanged but affecting its ownership). Immobility, on the
other hand, would make an asset more subject to erosion or destruction thus reducing
its value but maintaining its ownership intact. Expropriation by the state has the same
effect as theft but may affect both mobile and immobile assets. Capital cannot be both
invisible and immobile.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 8
Specificity describes capital’s degree of exclusiveness to an economic activity or sector.
The more specific capital is to one activity or sector, the more vulnerable it is to
military action in that area. This has an impact on the effect of anticipated warfare:
Non-specific capital may be reallocated to another activity thus harming production in
the threatened sector even before hostilities commence but at least putting this capital
to some use in the economy (albeit at lower productivity). Specific capital, on the other
hand, may continue to be operated even during the war but once attacked may cease
to be functional. This makes general capital less risky compared to the all-or-nothing
property of specific capital.
The duration of capital characterises the economic life span or life horizon of capital. A
typical distinction is between non-durable and durable goods. The longer the life
horizon of a capital good, the more vulnerable it becomes to possible future wars.
A war vulnerable sector such as the rural sector (both subsistence and export-oriented)
in Mozambique is characterised by war vulnerable capital specific or common to that
sector. Two examples would include livestock and irrigation machinery, respectively.
A war vulnerable sector will experience the equivalent of a cost shock or an output tax
since the erosion, destruction and reallocation of its capital will decrease both the scale
of that sector and the overall economy. That is, the reduced capital stock acting as the
input into a production function will directly cause a reduction in the level of output (a
move along the function towards the origin). An indirect, transaction cost effect will
cause the whole function to shift downwards as externality effects reduce the density
of the market.
Portfolio holders will seek to reallocate their capital to optimise the portfolio in the
light of the new war circumstances. Some traders may actually experience an increase
in the profitability of their trading leading to further portfolio choices. War profiteers
also exploit temporary illegitimate profit-opportunities (which may have high returns),
providing an incentive to save. Other people likely to benefit from war and thus
confronted with portfolio choices may be weapons traders or generals. War profiteers
are likely to have a high savings propensity to the extent that they view the war as
temporary (Sen, 1991). Finally, government policy will create incentives and risks co-
determining capital reallocation and investment patterns.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 9
War is likely to operate on the optimal level of capital, the current level of capital and
on the adjustment coefficient of investment (denoted K*, Kt and l, respectively),
particularly for war vulnerable capital or war vulnerable sectors. That is current capital
is reduced through, for example, fighting while future capital may be reduced through
long-term uncertainty and increased tax rates. Also the adjustment coefficient may fall,
due to increased transaction costs in the economy and due to uncertainty.
3.2  Transactions Efficiency
Technology is “skills, knowledge and procedures for making, using and doing useful
things” (Stewart, p. 1, 1977). It can be seen to consist of two complementary
components: In a narrow sense technology involves (private) human capital including
knowledge and skills. In a broader sense it also includes non-physical social capital
created in part by government spending such as standards of government and
communal behaviour (“social” human capital). For technology to be made available
and subsequently be selected for use in a developing country, it requires physical
capital and the externalities derived from it. These three forms of capital (human,
social and physical) hence define the technology available to all economic agents and
the level of technologies selected, or absorbed, in a particular developing economy.
The potential level of technology used is improved further through scientific advance,
thus creating more technology, or through education and institutional change thus
permitting more availability and absorption (Ensminger, 1992).
Internal war in a developing country does not destroy global levels of technology but
it reduces the local absorption of technology. In particular, war leads to significantly
higher costs of market transactions, that is war reduces the transactions efficiency of the
war economy (North, 1990). (This effect of war is related to the dispute over authority,
that is to war uncertainty.) Transactions inefficiency may then shift down F(.) of
equation (1) and decrease the speed of investment in equation (2). That is l is reduced
by war both through the breakdown of markets generally and the individual firm’s
reduced ability to operate effectively.
The type of war has a large impact on transactions efficiency. A scorched-earth policy
in an internal war would have a comparatively larger negative effect on technologicalQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 10
absorption and hence transaction costs than would a swift, stable international war.6 If
only private assets but no social capital are affected by war, a quick restoration of
private sector investment and output levels is possible soon after a war shock thus
making a post-war peace dividend feasible. If much social and private capital has been
destroyed, however, private investment will not recover unless public investment and
confidence accompany the return of peace. Transactions inefficiency in conjunction
with war uncertainty may thus lead to the destruction of the development capacity of
the war economy. Such destruction of technological absorption and confidence will be
hard to overcome even in the long-term.7
3.3  Uncertainty
The following paragraphs will consider a definition and sources of risk and
uncertainty, opportunities for coping with them, and some of their basic effects.
Consumption decisions and changes in the capital stock are closely related to issues of
risk, uncertainty and expectations. A situation of perfect certainty is one in which all
future events can be predicted without mistake by all economic agents, that is perfect
foresight exists. In reality, however, events are impossible to predict accurately.
Risk represents the subjective probabilities agents attach to the occurrence of future
events. This means that micro-economic variables will not be deterministic but rather
have probability distributions of occurrence, which agents try to estimate based on
their personal knowledge, experience and expectation-generating mechanism. In a war
economy, this includes people’s expectation of their time of and age at death.
                    
6 The former was in fact pursued by Renamo in the rural areas hostile to its control. Its
aim was to destabilise through deliberately random terror and to cream off the rural
surplus as a way of financing its own war effort. However, it was not possible to
achieve both aims in the long run. Renamo acted myopically as it destroyed much
social capital and hence reduced the ability of those areas to recreate output thus
damaging its own supply of war finance.
7 It would be interesting to compare the breakdown of technology under war
conditions with other such instances, e.g. as a result of informal or illegal market
activity. Such markets may find substitutes for state provided technology hence
ensuring continued market density (see also Chingono, 1995). War activity may be
different from such activities if for example volatility and unique dangers of the war
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Several sources of risk can be identified in the context of agricultural developing
countries (Ellis, 1993): Natural hazards or output risk, market or price fluctuations,
social risk, and state actions. The existence of risk can allow markets for insurance to
develop by providing insurers with a profitable opportunity for the diversification of
imperfectly correlated risks. The provision of fair insurance would permit savings and
production decisions to be made by agents regardless of the risks being faced.
Instances of insurable risk could include fire, accident, crop failure, long, short or no
further life, and ill health. Yet frequently insurance markets break down. This could be
due either to moral hazard or adverse selection problems, so that informal provision of
insurance (e.g. through interlocked markets or non-market institutions) may be more
efficient as long as the risks are imperfectly correlated among different members of the
relevant group. In addition, insurance will not be provided to cover for war-induced
damages as war is a highly correlated risk for a given geographical, ethnic or political
entity.
The main question in this context is whether one would expect war to change people’s
attitude to risk. While at first sight such change may seem likely, a more realistic
approximation of risk behaviour is to consider an unchanged utility function across
time but to recognise that it is not people’s attitudes but their actions that change as
their circumstances deteriorate. That is, individuals close to the survival threshold will
not become more risk averse but they will act differently in order to avoid a further
deterioration of their situation. Each person has an inherent contingency plan for how
to behave in the face of disaster. The drawing closer of the disaster precipitates the pre-
specified action, not a new plan. If, for example, agents’ survival probability p is
related to their consumption level but their utility function remains unchanged, their
actions would focus ever more intensely on maintaining a minimum level of
consumption as they approach the survival threshold. On the other hand, the
population as a whole may exhibit various risk attitudes. For example, people drafted
will not become more risk averse simply because they are now fighting but their
personal attitude towards risk taking is determined by their personality from the start.
Therefore, this model treats utility as not being directly affected by war.
Uncertainty refers to the experience of a variety of risks in the whole economy.
Expectations tend to be defined relative to some optimal value (such as K* for capital)QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 12
and may influence adjustment variables such as l for the case of investment.
Information availability and processing will thus be crucial to coping with risk and
uncertainty at the micro and macro levels of the economy. The expectations formation
process itself may be damaged or affected by, for instance, a confusing war situation
lacking either clear battle lines or victors. War uncertainty therefore is the extreme
version of state-induced uncertainty. This is distinguished by its near-perfect
correlation of risks among households and hence its uninsurability.
The source of much war uncertainty is the conflict between two parties over authority
and legitimacy. The erosion of either or both increases war uncertainty. Thus war
uncertainty need not imply “maximum” uncertainty but rather a form of uncertainty
related to fundamental state functions and actions. Further adding to war uncertainty
is the imprecise nature of the start and end of wars. Both for agents affected and for
research purposes it may be difficult to date wars in the economic sense. For most
economic purposes, conflicts last longer than the military campaign itself. An example
of this is the case of an expected demobilisation of one army at the conclusion of an
internal war.
War uncertainty operates at the micro and macro levels of the economy. Capital, for
instance, may be exposed to war destruction and dislocation at the micro level through
theft and violence (micro war uncertainty) and at the macro level through the abuse of
state authority in a partisan way (macro war uncertainty). In addition, macro war
uncertainty includes the use of the government fiscal machinery and economic
regulation for war-related purposes thus reducing transactions efficiency. For agents,
war uncertainty will be more severely felt the less they can substitute from vulnerable
into less vulnerable assets or activities. The existence of vulnerability reducing
institutions such as social networks and income diversification opportunities permit a
reduction of this exposure to war uncertainty thus positively affecting people’s
welfare.
Some basic consequences of war uncertainty include: A large reduction of social
capital, reducing the size of a future peace dividend and undermining confidence in
the long-term viability of the economy. In addition, the reduction in confidence is
likely to reduce asset transactions (except for the purpose of war-induced reallocationQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 13
or war-profiteers’ asset accumulation) with the consequences of reduced investment
and productivity, fewer risk-reduction opportunities, and further reduced market
density.
The war uncertainty associated with the government is dependent on the type of
conflict: In a stable international war, the government may have little uncertainty
attached to its operations. The more likely it becomes that the opponent’s aim of
assuming sole leadership will be achieved (or the more volatile the war perhaps as a
proportion of domestic territory affected in a short time period), the more single-
minded the government will become in placing the war effort above all other policies.
That is, the more threatened a government is the more it will regulate the economy to
ensure its own victory.8 But a more regulated economy is also likely to be less efficient.
Furthermore, such threatened leadership may increase uncertainty by reducing policy
credibility. The effects will be a reduction in investment due to the immobility of some
forms of capital (an undesirable property of capital in times of uncertainty), due to the
effect of uncertainty on savings (van Wijnbergen, 1992), and due to capital flight.
3.4  Fiscal Deficit
The fiscal deficit of the government is endogenously determined by warfare through
effects on the tax revenue T and on government expenditure G. Both variables are
dependent on the type of war fought. Tax revenues depend particularly on the war
experience of the population as they are also the targets of the tax authority. Negative
influences on T may be counterbalanced to some extent through coercion, both in
volatile and in inconsistent wars, by increases in the tax rates and the tax bases. Yet
there will be decreasing returns to scale in such activities due to tax evasion, which
itself should be easier to achieve successfully in times of internal war. An easily taxable
sector for a government in a developing country is the agricultural export sector as it
involves a few readily recognisable units such as multinational firms with offices and
accounts available in the capital, large concentrated plantations, obvious harvests and
hence trading seasons, bulky goods, and particularly few channels of transport (e.g.
international ports). Hence one would expect the agricultural export sector to beQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 14
particularly vulnerable to excess war taxation. Finally, tax raising operations will be
limited further by the parallel decline in transactions efficiency, human and social
capital, and the increase in uncertainty all working to undermine the effectiveness of
tax raising operations by decreasing the revenue base and reducing the morale and
habits of the taxable population further.
In the spirit of Barro (1990), there may be four functions of government spending:
Providing production inputs, property rights, household consumption goods, and
providing government consumption goods. The first function involves the government
taxing the private sector to redistribute such revenue in the form of public production
inputs (GP). Second, the government may spend its revenue (GL) on creating and
enforcing property rights and other legal services needed to maintain an economic
environment conducive to undertaking market transactions. As the private sector will
benefit from the existence of a legal system without directly depending on it in the
production process, this aspect of government activity is considered separately under
the heading “transactions efficiency”.
Third, the government may use its tax revenue to provide consumption goods (GH in
aggregate, h per household) to households directly, for example by subsidising
housing. Such consumption would enter the agent’s utility function directly alongside
privately purchased consumption goods such that u = (c,h). In the context of war
analysis, this may be relevant for the modelling of why wars take place and how
leaderships attempt to bribe their followers to achieve victory. But below, this function
of government will be ignored. Finally, the government may provide itself with
consumption goods using its available tax revenue. That is, the war effort for instance
will require the government to spend a share of its budget on unproductive war
activities (GW) from which the government itself derives utility.
As in the case of tax revenue T, government expenditure G will be affected by the type
of conflict under way. Divergent styles of warfare by the two sides in a war result in
different fiscal needs of both sides. In many conflicts it may be justifiable to determine
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the activity of the rebels as costless for the government (i.e. it is not in need of T or G
and outside the GDP accounting framework) and exogenously determined (e.g.
through the donation of foreign military hardware). As the rebels cannot normally
provide their own consumption goods as bribes to the population, the rebels’ main aim
may hence be the reduction of the government’s tax base and revenue. The actual size
of government expenditure is not likely to be indicative of the extent of government
involvement and regulation of the economy. In line with the need to raise further
taxes, regulations such as production quotas, set prices or contributions in kind will
give the government further opportunities for fulfilling its need for command over
resources but these also have the effect of further increasing market transaction costs.
Foreign civilian aid may be increased or decreased in times of war hence positively or
negatively affecting the fiscal deficit. Typically, one would expect a reduction in
investment or project-oriented aid in line with the general reduction of investment in
the economy while expecting an increase in consumption and relief-oriented aid to
lessen the negative human costs associated with war. The net effect of war on aid is
ambiguous a priori: War may (or may not) increase the inflow of foreign aid into the
economy. But aid generally is dependent on factors exogenous to the recipient
country. The uncertainties surrounding the provision of aid are another factor
contributing to increased level of war uncertainty.
Aid resources may either directly benefit the government (thus allowing increased
government spending) or they could enter the private sector directly (thus affecting
private capital stocks and consumption levels). In any case, foreign aid inflows will
relax the balance of payments constraint.
Finally, the fact that many developing countries are controlled economies seemingly
complicates the analysis of the economic impact of war. Yet two factors help to ease
the matter. First, the planning policies followed often are partially shaped by the
experience of the war (the political change is not entirely exogenous) so that they need
not be considered a fully independent variable. But this strengthens the concern over
the use of models assuming free choice of individual consumption levels. Second,
                                                                                                                                                           
very authoritarian and centralised affair (Milward, 1970).QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 16
socialist reforms often work in the same direction as the effects of war (e.g. in reducing
the efficiency of the market) so that while it may be difficult to assess the relative
strengths of the two variables, they both have similar effects (see also Wuyts, 1989).
In conclusion, it may be justifiable to consider only the fiscal position of the
government as the rebels’ activity is largely exogenously determined. Depending on
the type of warfare undertaken, T will need to be increased but opportunities to do so
diminish during certain wars while G is raised, particularly for a high-tech war. The
net result is likely to be a steep increase in the overall fiscal deficit of the government
with consequences for policy credibility and long-term investment confidence.
3.5  Individuals
First, consider the individual’s objective function:
max ( ( ))







and the corresponding budget constraint:
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This set of equations is important as it represents a rational, optimising economic agent
who derives her utility from consumption spread across the present and future. The
only restriction placed upon her is that the net present value of her consumption may
not exceed the net present value of her resources. The agent’s challenge is to determine
the optimal levels of consumption and savings given her set of resources consisting of
labour income y and wealth.
The context of Britain in World War II suggests that consumption, savings and
incomes are not jointly determined by individuals and by central government (Keynes,
1978). With rationing, consumption is not an entirely market-determined variable. Yet
labour supply, wages and hence incomes are not fully market driven in a war
economy, either, as people are being drafted into the army. As Keynes realised for the
case of Britain, it is essential for financing any war effort to calculate optimal values forQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 17
these variables centrally while accepting parallel but decentralised market behaviour.
The present analysis will utilise the set-up reflected in equations (3) and (4) while
recognising the limited realism of this theoretical polar case under conditions of war
and some degree of central planning.
3.6  Firms
Following Barro (1990), assume a private sector production function CRS in capital K





























where  a represents the effectiveness of government versus private services in
production. Capital in this equation has been defined broadly to include human
capital L. This formulation of the production function F(.) introduces a number of
interesting concepts. First, it shows that a shock-related reduction of capital K will
affect output immediately. In addition, a similar reduction in government spending G
or a destruction of public infrastructure financed by past government spending will
also reduce private output.
Second, it shows the need for a government sector except for the limiting case of
private output only depending on private sector inputs, such as capital and labour.
That is any discussion employing the simplified production function F(K, L) must be
aware that it can only reflect the polar case of perfectly competitive, functioning
markets. The endogenous growth literature on the one hand and the empirical
prevalence of controlled economies in developing countries on the other hand suggest
that one must consider the role and effects of the government sector on the economy.
Furthermore, under perfect competition the marginal product of capital equals the rate
of interest r. Yet empirically, r is frequently determined by non-market forces (e.g. it
may be set by the government) with informal credit markets charging seemingly
excessive rates and credit rationing being practised. This suggests the existence of
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Third, equation (1) introduces variables A and a reflecting the level of absorbed
technology of the economy. These variables will be particularly difficult to estimate
but to the extent that war reduces the take-up of technology, these variables will
change.
Current investment, It, is assumed to be determined as follows: :
() IK K tt =- £ £
*
- ll 1 , 0 1
(2)
where K* stands for the desired capital level in the current period, Kt-1 for last period’s
actual capital level, and l for the adjustment coefficient of investment.9 The latter
determines the speed of adjustment. According to standard theory, this ought to be
determined by relative prices of inputs and the exchange rate for the open economy.
However, the degree of factor substitution and the availability of finance will also be
important in practice. In fact, one might expect that in war, to the extent that banks are
physically destroyed, the flow of financial funds available for investment might be
reduced. Yet if investment is financed by retained earnings, the importance of financial
markets is strongly reduced. Overall, l is a summary variable reflecting a large set of
economic conditions. Once more, it is important to consider the polar case of perfect
markets which implies instantaneous adjustment where l is set equal to 1.
The desired capital level K* for period t is a function of relative output prices,
profitability and demand as well as a function of expectations under uncertainty. The
latter case becomes important in times of war in particular. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
formulate the theory of option value. It accounts for three stylised facts of investment:
Any investment project involves uncertain future costs and benefits, investors can
decide the timing of investment, and investments are reversible only at a cost once
undertaken. These facts require that the net present return of investments must equal
the net present cost of investments plus the cost of keeping the option to undertake the
investment open. That is there is always some value in not investing under
                    
9 This analysis for the time being abstracts from issues of depreciation. In practice, war
may increase capital depreciation. For example, landmines will depreciate the value of
land. However, given the high land/labour ratio in Mozambique, this is likely to be a
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uncertainty. Under conditions of extreme or war uncertainty, this option value may be
very high, thus explaining why apparent liquidity in an economy may correspond
with very low levels of actual investment. From that point of view, war uncertainty is
an extreme form of policy uncertainty, which can act as a tax on investment (Rodrik,
1991).
Finally, beyond the planning, execution and financing of investment lies the issue of
how household savings (that is income minus expenditure) is being translated into
investment and hence increased future output. Models such as that of Blanchard (1985)
concentrate on the treatment of household choices and assume a one-to-one
transformation of savings into investment. Yet as seen above, consumption and
investment are functions of different variables (among others, income and
profitability, respectively). Thus the assumption of the equality of consumption and
savings may not hold a priori (Schmidt-Hebbel et al, 1996). Therefore, models
considering both private optimal consumption and firms’ optimal production ought to
consider more explicitly the link by which foregoing the former leads to the latter.
Overall, economic shocks may affect firms by influencing current and desired capital,
the production technology, the investment adjustment coefficient, and firm-relevant
government spending. These variables in turn determine investment and output
levels.
3.7 Government
Consider a government with the following objective function (Barro, 1990):
max ( )
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where G(t) denotes current government spending, r(t)B(t) denotes current government
debt service payments, T(t) denotes current taxation revenue, dB(t)/dt denotes theQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 20
increase in government debt for the current period, and M(t) the current foreign aid
received by the government.
Equation (5) states a specific but perhaps not obvious government objective function.
For the purpose of analysing changes in preferences and war, however, governments
may conveniently be viewed as following a specific agenda, for example maximising
their war-related government spending. Yet as war economies frequently are subjected
to strict economic controls, one could also view the government objective function as
consisting of maximising national output or asset value (Milward, 1970).
The constraint (6) indicates a number of ways in which a government can raise its
resources, namely taxation, debt and foreign assistance. It will be important to
consider the decomposition of government spending and the sources of taxation in the
war economy. Each may have further economic effects and may be subject to economic
shocks. Overall, the variables G, T, and M will be affected by economic shocks and will
in turn determine the debt B and perhaps the rate of interest r.
4.  A Dynamic Model And Its Predictions
The aim of this section is to analyse the dynamic effects of a war shock by building an
intertemporal model of a closed economy based on the definition of war and the
discussion of the war variables and the economic agents developed above. Particular
issues to be analysed include the effects of government war-finance, the effects on
capital formation and the level of private consumption. The analysis in this section will
start from the benchmark of perfect markets since this permits the model to be build
on explicit micro foundations. A basic macro-model will be introduced and its
principle mechanisms of operation discussed before extending it to take account of
war. This model will yield some predictions which will be tested for the Mozambican
case. Assume initially that the change induced by war occurs instantaneously between
two time periods. This assumption will permit the analysis of the effects of a war
shock. Later in the analysis it will become apparent, however, that some war shocks
have a long-term impact thus implying different types of time profiles for changes in
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4.1  The Set-Up of the Model
The basic model of this section, first developed by Blanchard (1985) and well explained
in Blanchard and Fischer (pp. 115-126, 1989), is characterised by two crucial
assumptions. First, it assumes that individuals have a finite horizon as people have a
constant probability of death per unit time, p, throughout their lifetime. This is
equivalent to expressing the expectation of the variable time-remaining-till-death, X, as
E(X) = 1/p. The value of the parameter p is determined by, for instance, conditions of
public health and nutrition and is uniform across the whole population. Note that p
represents the only source of individual uncertainty in the model. This set-up will
imply a model with varying horizons among agents and overlapping generations
(OLG) but it will not capture life-cycle effects or diversity among agents in their
marginal propensity to consume. The absence of retirement may be more realistic in
developing countries with no social security system and low life expectancy. The
absence of childhood, however, does not fit as well with reality. The more
homogenous the economy under analysis, the more realistic the model will be.
It would be interesting to make explicit the dependence of p and 1/p on living
conditions through the specification of the following function (Gersovitz, 1983):
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(7)
This shows that indirect effects of war leading to a reduction in consumption can kill if
consumption falls below the threshold level of c. For the time being, however, only the
basic model will be considered.
Second, the basic model assumes perfectly competitive markets. Further assume that
individuals only derive utility from their own consumption, not from that of their
relatives (hence ruling out positive bequests), and that negative bequests are not
permitted. Under the ensuing utility maximisation problem, perfectly competitive
insurance companies hence sell policies paying a premium of p to each person alive
per unit time, in exchange for a unit of the deceased person’s estate on his death. All
agents will find it optimal to contract out at the beginning of their life their whole
wealth-upon-death thus receiving the premium pV(t) each period while alive. DeathQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 22
itself brings zero utility to the individual. In order to justify this obvious abstraction
from reality, agents may be viewed as making use of non-market institutions such as
multigenerational families and households in trading their wealth-upon-death for
current support hence approximating the working of the efficient market. However,
agents continue to follow individual, not group, maximisation.





















where s = 1 for realistic simplicity. As will be seen below, a decrease in the elasticity of
substitution decreases the steady-state capital stock in the basic model.
The objective function, which each agent aims to maximise at time t, is:
log ( , )







where q stands for the individual rate of time preference (or personal discount rate).
This shows that the additional uncertainty deriving from the unknown time of death is
equivalent to increasing the personal discount rate. The objective function is
maximised subject to the budget constraint which assumes perfect markets. In times of
rationing, or with imperfect markets more generally, people may not be able to make
use of their earnings and forced savings can result (Barro and Grossman, 1971).
Individual and aggregate consumption are a function of individual and aggregate
wealth, respectively, with a marginal propensity to consume (MPC) of p+q, as shown
below for the aggregate case:
() ( ) () () [] Ct p Vt Ht =+ + q (10)
V(t) and H(t) denote non-human and human wealth, respectively, and capital letters
denote aggregate variables. Changes in these wealth variables can be expressed as:QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 23
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Together, these three equations denote the aggregate behaviour of the economy. Both
the MPC and the discount rate for human wealth are positively related to p, the death
probability. Note that the assumptions concerning the death probability and
logarithmic utility strongly shape this result, in particular the assumption that MPC is
independent of the interest rate. There exists a difference in the rate of individual
wealth accumulation, r+p, and aggregate wealth accumulation, r, which will motivate
some of the discussion to follow. The difference results from the second crucial
assumption about insurance availability where the payment pV is a transfer, but not
net social wealth. A newly born cohort owns zero wealth by assumption (see equation
(11) for this condition) which explains the breakdown of Ricardian equivalence below.
The constant returns net production function for the two inputs labour capital and
labour is defined as:
() FKL A K L A K L ,, == =
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which characterise equilibrium in this model. Figure 1 represents this dynamic system
as a phase diagram.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 24
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Source: Blanchard, p. 232, 1985.
The locus dK/dt = 0 follows from the shape of the production function and represents
the steady state in which all output is consumed (F(K) = C(t)) while the dC(t)/dt = 0
locus is convex from the origin, approaches Kb asymptotically and represents the
steady state level of consumption. At Ka, F’(Ka) = 0, that is steady state consumption is
maximised. At Kb, F’(Kb) = q , and at Kc, F’(Kc) = (p+q), such that Kc < Kb < Ka. KE is the
first equilibrium level of capital where the two loci intersect at point EQ such that q <
F’(KE) < (p+q). This property of r > q is required for the creation of positive aggregate
capital formation given the assumption of a flat life-cycle income and the first order
conditions of the maximisation problem. That is, there will have to be positive savings
initially for each individual to maintain a positive capital stock in the aggregate. A
second equilibrium exists at the origin. Equilibrium EQ is associated with the unique
upward sloping saddle path SS. Therefore, r > q ³ 0 implies dynamic efficiency in this
system.
The government in this simple model will provide, first, some capital goods GP to the
private sector which will be included in a broad definition of capital. Second, it will
spend a fixed amount GL on the maintenance of law, order and property rights thus
improving the transactions efficiency and hence the production function. Third, the
government will allocate GW to the war effort, which is entirely unproductive. Hence
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marginal utility of C and hence leaves individual consumption decisions unaffected),
collects non-distortionary lump-sum taxes T and holds the level of debt B.
The new expressions for aggregate consumption and wealth (which now including the
government variables and its budget constraint) imply that for p > 0, Ricardian
equivalence breaks down because newly-born agents do not own any non-human
wealth (Sen, 1994). This will affect the welfare impact of government debt.
4.2  Capital
An exogenous decrease in physical capital induced by war through destruction,
erosion or reallocation would be reflected in the basic model as an exogenous, one-off
reduction in the value of the aggregate variable K for a given population size. In
conjunction with the second crucial assumption, this implies that each agent’s capital
stock must be reduced equally by a reduction in K. Otherwise life insurance companies
would no longer find it profitable to continue paying premia pv(s,t) while receiving
smaller net payments upon death in total. Instead, premia and payments shrink
proportionately. Thus capital holdings and hence wealth for individuals, on the one
hand, as well as the capital available for production as an input (that is V), on the other
hand, are reduced by war (a budget-production duality for K). This is reflected by an
exogenously reduced value of K in the model.
This capital destruction resembles a natural disaster shock and subsequent adjustment
process. The effects of a reduction in the capital stock can be evaluated in terms of
equations (14) and (11): The negative capital shock to, say, K’ will require a parallel,
temporary reduction in C(t) to allow capital to accumulate along SS, that is to ensure
that F(K) > C(t) until the steady state once more holds at EQ in figure 1. The speed of
adjustment back to the old and new equilibrium at K* depends on investment lags and
on how the war affected the other war variables. Overall, the temporary capital
reduction works as a step back in time for welfare: The old equilibrium level of capital
may be obtained but the lost welfare resulting from decreased consumption in times of
the re-accumulation of capital is permanent. Equivalently, the total past consumption
post-shock will be smaller than it would have been in the absence of war but the level
of consumption relative to the new capital stock at K* will be the same. Hence,
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If post-war economies, perhaps even the defeated side, seemingly attain higher levels
of output and welfare than peace-time or victorious countries, it is not simply due to
the destruction and replacement of capital as modelled here.
Labour income and hence human wealth are not variables directly affected by war in
this model. Yet an instantaneous, one-off and equiproportionate reduction in the
population, and hence labour stock L, across all cohorts through death, disability or
migration would shrink the size of the entire economy for a given capital stock and at
full employment. However, the level of uncertainty would not increase as this war
shock is instantaneous. Hence, all equations involving aggregation across all cohorts
will find their respective values reduced by a reduction in labour. In equation (11), a
reduction in L would decrease C(t), as fewer people now exist to consume, and it
would decrease F(K), as less labour input is available to produce, revealing a
consumption-production duality. The difference between K and L is an asymmetry at
the individual level: That is a reduction in K affects every individual a little but a
reduction in L affects only some individuals (but those very severely).10 The fact that
insurance companies are willing to continue to offer policies to individuals affected by
war indicates the special assumptions on which the model and the shock are based. In
circumstances of asymmetry (e.g. people are either soldiers or civilians) and imperfect
information (insurance companies cannot distinguish these two types), companies
may refuse to offer the contracts used in this model since soldiers are more likely to die
than civilians. These people would be contributing less to the insurance fund until
death than the average person, thus making those contracts unprofitable. Depending
on the number of individuals affected by war, the insurance market either breaks
down or contracts become more expensive making them less worthwhile particularly
for civilians who are less likely to die. In fact, the population is heterogeneous in
regard to another aspect abstracted from in the model, namely aspects of the life cycle.
People are born and may die being dependent on their families for maintenance and
                    
10 A similar asymmetric effect results from the destruction of capital in a non-CRS
model: The owner of profits accruing from capital will incur a relatively larger loss
from the destruction of his capital than will society at large. If capital is specific and
the war shock instantaneous, capital destruction will increase the future marginal
productivity of investment. Yet the war in Mozambique was quasi-permanent so that
war vulnerable capital, despite an otherwise high MPI, is unlikely to be replaced. That
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care. The war-induced death of economically inactive child causes a reduction in
transfer payments but also a destruction of discounted future earnings while the death
of an inactive old person would only reduce transfer payments thus revealing a further
asymmetry.
In conclusion, a reduction in capital is readily modelled in this context. Yet there is an
asymmetry between a reduction in the labour force at the aggregate versus the
individual level. The prediction, therefore, concerning the effects of a reduction in the
war variable capital is that it will lead to a temporarily decreased level of
consumption. This recovers with the re-accumulation of capital, although the output
level possible before the shock will no longer be obtained thus leading to a reduction
in welfare.
4.3  Transactions Efficiency
The function F(.) with its parameters A and a of the production function (13) define
the constant returns to scale (CRS) production technology absorbed in this model. As
previously discussed, the type of war affects the level of absorbed technology. For
example in an internal war, the biased government may be unable to provide law and
order thus increasing transaction costs and harming production (as well as increasing
uncertainty), possibly for lengthy periods of time.
This effect may be represented by defining a productivity parameter At in the
production function (13) such that At+1 < At, thus reducing output for a given level of
capital and labour inputs (i.e. making production less productive but keeping it
efficient). Such unexpected multiplicative productivity shock reduces the marginal
productivity of capital and has two effects in equations (14) and (11): On the one hand,
the dK/dt schedule will shift down to reduce consumption for a given capital stock.
On the other hand, the dC/dt schedule will shift left, as consumption will increase but
the marginal product of capital will decrease for a given capital level. Overall, then, the
equilibrium will move from EQ to EQ’ in figure 2, that is the economy is shrinking.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 28









The decrease in spending GL reducing At can also be looked at as an increase in the
effective income tax rate since a less effective tax collection calls for an increase in the
rate of taxation. This illustrates the positive effect of government spending in the field
of property rights and the legal system.
Equivalently, a negative productivity shock may be modelled as a rise in the rate of
taxation where the extra revenue was spent by the government as to leave agents’
utility unaffected. As such, an increase in the effective tax rate may last for a long time
(until tax compliance has been re-established), government and the private sector will
find their post-war capacity for reconstruction strongly diminished. The government
therefore has less scope for revenue raising thus reducing the number of new
investment projects available for reconstruction. Furthermore, the private sector faces
lower incentives for investment at the given, higher rates of effective taxation. This
interdependence of government spending and transactions efficiency is an example of
the complex interactions in a war economy.
In conclusion, the effect of war on transactions efficiency is twofold: At the aggregate
level, technological regress reduces the size of the economy for a given size of the
population and thus leads to lower welfare per capita. In addition, technological
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this is a difficult concept to express within the dynamic model. Proxies for this effect
include the increased tax burden or reduced productivity of individual firms.
4.4  Uncertainty
The model captures uncertainty through the individual probability of death, p, and the
expected individual life horizon, 1/p. A one-off war shock will kill some people and
thus shrink the economy but would not affect uncertainty. This section is hence
concerned with a sudden change to p which lasts several periods.
War may be modelled in this context by increasing the value of the parameter p, thus
specifying an increased probability of death through the additional possibility of dying
in war actions. Obviously, the type of war will affect the extent of such increase in p:
Military action only aimed at military targets would only increase p for soldiers.
However, with the advent of high technology warfare aimed at civilians and the
continuation of “medieval” warfare in many developing countries, the whole
population may directly experience an increase in the value of p. In fact, about 95% of
all war-related deaths in Mozambique were of civilians (Stewart, 1993).
In addition, wars may kill citizens directly through fighting or indirectly through
malnutrition and disease which may result from a breakdown in markets induced by
high transaction costs and which in turn leaves sections of the population (e.g.
refugees, peasants) more vulnerable than others. It may thus be difficult to estimate the
exact extent of war-related increases in the probability of death and it may be slightly
unrealistic to assume this affects the population uniformly.
On the one hand, actual deaths diminish some people’s human capital completely and
diminish total human capital (the labour force) slightly. On the other hand, the
increase in p increases everybody’s uncertainty slightly. Hence the effect of the first
casualty in war is two-fold: First, it reduces aggregate human capital and, second, it
changes aggregate perception of likely mortality to a new and higher p. An increase in
p then results in a shift of dC(t)/dt in equation (14) to the left (thus reducing the
optimal steady state capital level KE and increasing the steady-state interest rate. This
effect is reversible, given functional markets, once war uncertainty and hence p revert
to peace-time levels. Yet with strong transactions inefficiency, markets may be unable
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therefore have a permanent effect. Expressed differently, p may revert back to its usual
level much quicker than output.
Return for a moment to the endogenous survival probability of Gersovitz (1983). Recall
that people may die from the indirect effects of war if war results in levels of
consumption below a threshold of c. At the micro level, this implies increasing
propensities to consume with decreasing incomes. In addition, endogenous survival
may lead to a reduction in the efficiency of the annuity market. Three cases may occur:
The poor subsidise the better off (as the poor have a lower survival probability), the
market breaks down completely, or informal institutions (the family) substitute for the
inefficient annuity market. Thus endogenised survival provides a further rationale on
why the basic model’s assumption of perfect markets may not obtain in reality. In
addition, this extension indicates once more how development may become
unsustainable under war conditions. The decreased consumption of large parts of the
population would force more people closer to the survival limit and lead to further
income inequality or market failure through the channel of the annuity market.
Other elements of uncertainty may of course be present in a situation of war. This
includes people’s willingness to discount future benefits more highly (affecting q) as
well as the dispersion of prices, quantities traded and the variance of other such
economic variables. In regard to q, one may abstract from varying this parameter due
to war as it acts in the same way as p. The individual’s objective function (3) shows
this clearly. The level of consumption in equations (7) and (8) also is co-determined by
both q and p. Any increase in the value of q would hence only reinforce the increase in
the value of p and thus the basic conclusion of a reduced capital level but such
modification would not create any further analytical results. Generally, an analysis
with several forms of uncertainty may not yield results much different from this basic
model, making the analysis hardly worthwhile (for such extensions, see Blanchard and
Fischer, 1989). The conclusion would remain that consumption is a function of current
and future incomes, wealth, and parameters of taste and risk aversion. Therefore, this
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4.5  Fiscal Deficit
The effect of an increase in GW or a decrease in T are symmetric in this model, hence a
change in both variables can be analysed as a comparably stronger change in one
variable only. Furthermore, the inflow of foreign aid, as mentioned above, may in this
model be viewed as increasing T and thus expanding the government’s budget
constraint. Conditions on aid may prevent the government from freely allocating it to
any of the four uses of G. Yet even aid tied to humanitarian purposes may free other
resources which in turn can be dedicated to the war effort. Spending a part of the
budget on the war effort amounts to the burning of productive resources on the supply
side of the economy. The following paragraphs will consider the effects of an increased
budget deficit spent on the war.
First, government expenditure on non-productive or non-utility raising goods may
also be modelled as a negative additive shock to the production function. This is a non-
monetary taxation system, in which the government suddenly and permanently
extracts a set amount of resources T per unit of time from producers such that equation
(13) becomes:
FK A K T () =-
a
(16)
This additive shock, however, leaves the marginal product of capital unchanged so
that, in a world with otherwise no government activity, dC(t)/dt in equation (14) is not
directly affected. Equation (15), specifying dK/dt, will have a reduced value for F(K)
thus shifting down to maintain equality between F(K) and C(t). Therefore, dC(t)/dt
will be shifted right as (for a given capital stock and a given marginal capital
productivity) consumption will have to decrease. Thus, consumption decreases but the
capital stock is unaffected at the new equilibrium EQ’ in figure 3.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 32











Second, government debt finance in this model has a differential welfare impact as
different people in the model are differentially affected by government debt and
taxation. Consider a given level of G but a reduction in T at time t due to the war,
ultimately financed through increased taxation in time t+s in the post-war period.
Under these circumstances, the government needs to conform to its budget constraint
which uses the interest rate r(t). Aggregate demand is increased through increased net
human wealth and hence higher consumption (both a larger tax reduction and a larger
s work to increase consumption further). Yet human wealth is defined using the
discount factor r+p. A proportion of agents at time t will expect not to be alive at time
t+s when some newly-born generations will have to contribute to the increased tax
burden. Since the newly-born agents do not possess wealth at birth as discussed above,
they carry the burden of financing previous budget deficits. Their welfare is thus
traded off against previous generations’ increased welfare.
The focus of the third issue is the portfolio effects of fiscal policy on general
equilibrium. A reduction in T at time t and an offsetting increase in T at time t+s for a
constant G increase the equilibrium level of debt and reduce the steady state level of
capital. Likewise, an increase in GW and B for a constant T would have a comparative
negative effect on the steady state capital level (the crucial magnitude being the net
fiscal deficit). Hence, government debt is a burden on the economy in this model as itQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 33
displaces capital from the portfolio of individual savers and thus diminishes the
productive capacity to sustain growth now and in the future.
Fourth, the decomposition of government expenditure indicates that even if the
government wishes to reallocate some of its GP expenditure towards GW (thus
increasing G by less than GW at the start of the war), the economy will suffer negative
effects. That is, the government cannot decrease GP by as much as GW increases
because less productive spending also implies less tax revenue. The externality of GP
hence ensures that even with budgetary reallocation, war spending always implies a
debt burden. For example, a reduction in spending on productive capital will decrease
firms’ effectiveness, as can be seen from equation (1) where G is replaced by GP.
Consider a government objective function such as equation (5) subject to equation (6).
The government agent then solves her maximisation problem by setting the efficient
level of GP to be made available to the private sector (which is GP/Y = a), hence
maximising the tax earnings and thus the net gain of GW. The provision of GP will still
be productively efficient but the share of government revenue in the economy will be
higher than the optimal level (i.e. a = GP/Y < G/Y = T/Y). Hence taxes are too high
and the economy suffers a war burden.
Government war spending therefore imposes a double burden on the economy: It
reduces output now and, through public debt and taxation, prevents the re-
accumulation of capital and output later. This reinforces the conclusion that it is the
unproductive use of resources, not a diminished ability to produce in the first place,
which is the central feature of an increased budget deficit.
4.6  Predictions of the Model
This section has outlined a basic model of overlapping generations in which
individuals face one type of uncertainty. The dynamic model permitted a structured
debate of the effects of war on the variables capital, transactions efficiency,
uncertainty, and fiscal deficit and in turn on the endogenous variables output, growth,
consumption, welfare, and government debt. These effects lead to nine predictions as
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Table 1: The Predictions of the Dynamic Model
Output Growth Consumption Welfare Government Debt
¯ Capital ¯ LR = LR ¯ SR ¯K: ¯; ¯L: = na P1
­ Fiscal Deficit = SR, ¯ LR ¯ LR ¯ LR = SR, ¯ LR ­ LR P2
¯ Transactions
Efficiency
¯¯ ¯ ¯ na P3
­ Uncertainty ¯¯ ¯ ¯ na P4
Net Effect P5: ¯ P6: ¯ P7: ¯ P8: ¯ P9: ­
P = prediction; na = not applicable; SR = short-run; LR = long-run; K = capital; L = labour
Prediction 1 states that, while capital destruction has a negative effect on levels of
output, consumption and welfare, the growth rate can recover in the long term. Yet
there is no long-term catching up. A decrease in the population size, on the other hand,
has the effect of shrinking the economy thus leaving the remaining workers’ welfare
unaffected. Both a reduction in K and it L could occur instantaneously or repeatedly,
the outcome is not dependent on this factor.
Prediction 2 states that an increased fiscal deficit has a differential welfare impact on
current versus future generations, thus leading to an eventual decline in both output
(and welfare) levels and the growth rate. Current generations may be unaffected,
though. Increased taxation may leave the capital stock and its productivity unaffected
but in the long-term the increased fiscal debt will displace private capital.
Prediction 3 states that the reduced transactions efficiency shrinks the size of the
economy and undermines the capacity of future development. Firms’ inside
production efficiency may remain unaffected but outside transactions inefficiency acts
like increased taxation on the firm.
Prediction 4 states that a one-off increase in uncertainty will stabilise the economy at
lower output levels and growth rates, as long as this level of uncertainty prevails. This
is brought about by a decrease in actual human capital and changed expectations
concerning death. Once more, a temporary shock will have a permanent effect.
Furthermore, transactions inefficiency and increased uncertainty reinforce each other
thus undermining further the development capacity of the economy.
The net effects of war on the main variables output, growth, consumption, government
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war will reduce the short and particularly the long-term level of output in the
economy. Prediction 6 states that war, in addition, will reduce the growth rate of the
war economy, possibly beyond the end of the war. In other words, catching up with
(or reducing divergence from) the counterfactual, peace-time output level will not
obtain in the long term. Predictions 7 and 8 state that under such conditions
consumption levels and welfare will fall, respectively. (Only some current generations
may escape the burden of the fiscal deficit.) Finally, prediction 9 states that, given the
government increases war spending and taxation will be low and falling, an increased
fiscal debt will obtain, thus further reinforcing other negative effects operating on the
war economy.
5.  Economic Effects of the War in Mozambique
This section applies the theory developed above to the case of Mozambique. Due to the
deficiencies of the data in Mozambique, changes in the war variables will be
represented by various proxies. The predictions of the dynamic model will then be
tested to evaluate the economic effects of the war in Mozambique. Given the data
limitations, the aim of this discussion is to indicate broad trends, not to provide
detailed econometric evidence.
5.1  Capital
The destruction and erosion of immobile and hence war vulnerable capital is shown in
table 2. Export agriculture would have suffered severely from the two-thirds reduction
in operational dams and plant nurseries as compared to the pre-war capital stock. The
average destruction and erosion of all categories was 40%. Assuming the war was at its
worst during the 10 years prior to the peace agreement, this implies an annual rate of
war-related capital reduction of almost 4%.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 36










Irrigation Systems 118 24 7 149 5 21
Dams 122 208 57 387 15 68
Seed Production
Centres
13 9 0 22 0 41
Nurseries 38 19 4 61 7 38
Tick-Cleansing
Tanks
70 299 40 509 8 67
Water Supply
Wells 3057 1071 138 4266 3 28
Holes 1225 530 32 1787 2 31
Fountains 484 205 11 700 2 31
Small Water
Supply Systems
96 84 29 209 14 54
Domestic Trade
Shops 6664 1318 2381 10363 23 36
Warehouses 369 8 40 417 10 12
Banks 144 6 4 154 3 6
Savings Posts 54 31 0 85 0 36
Communication
Post Offices 123 8 17 148 11 17
Rural Post Offices 49 90 13 152 9 68
Public Administration
District Admin. 117 33 42 192 22 39
Municipal Admin. 99 83 120 302 40 67
Admin. Residences 724 474 374 1572 24 54
Average 39.7%
Source: CNP, p. 21, December 1993.
An even higher rate of destruction and erosion was experienced by the railway system,
a visually obvious and politically suitable target for attacks. Table 3 also indicates the
constant, high level of military activity and subsequent insecurity experienced
throughout the 1980s.
Table 3: Destruction of CFM Locomotives




24 34 37 28 32 59 36 58
Units in Operation
b, c 222 222 249 214 178 172 146 158
Sources: a Stephens, pp. 136-141, 1994; b CNP, p. 25, December 1990; c World Bank, p.
69, October 1990.
Finally, figure 4 illustrates that cattle production, a visible yet somewhat mobile
activity, was strongly affected by war. Less than a fifth of its recorded 1980 cattle stockQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 37
remained in 1992, the remainder having been lost both through direct (rebels killing
cattle to spread terror, to halt development and to feed their troops) and indirect
effects (lack of feed and veterinary care, short-term consumption needs of the
population, and missing cattle markets for related trading and breeding activities).





















Source: Ministério da Agricultura, 1994.
Certain characteristics of capital make it vulnerable to war. Certain sectors employ
particular types of capital hence making some sectors more war vulnerable than
others. This allows a classification of war-affected and non-affected sectors in
Mozambique, as shown by table 4.
Table 4: War Vulnerability of Different Sectors in Mozambique
Sector Visible? Immobile? Specific? Duration? Vulnerability
Export-Oriented inputs xxx xx xx xxx medium
Agriculture production xxx xxx xxx xxx high
output xxx xx xxx xx medium
Manufacturing input xxx xx xxx xx medium
production xxx xxx xxx xxx high
output xxx xx xx xx medium
Subsistence land xx xxx xx x medium
Agriculture livestock xxx xxx xxx xxx high
seeds xx x xx xx medium
output xx xx x x low
Construction rural xx xxx x x low
urban xxx xxx xx xxx high
Government input xxx x xxx xxx high
output xx x xxx xxx high
x, xx and xxx denote low, medium and high relative war vulnerability, respectively.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 38
Export-oriented agricultural in Mozambique suffered a particularly high war burden.
The facts that crops are slow-growing, production is located in the countryside (where
most fighting took place), and that the bulky output needs to be transported in a
modern transport system through rural areas all contributed to the war vulnerability
of this cash crop sector. In fact, the pre-war transport sector had been a large foreign
exchange earner as it had transported goods for the neighbouring states of Malawi,
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Swaziland. The manufacturing sector, involving for
example the processing of cash crops, produced tradable goods at source (i.e. in rural)
or peri-urban areas. The war vulnerability of these location was high as occasional
attacks even near towns were probable. The visible location of production, the storage
of inventories (especially with poor transport and the seasonality of some crops), and
the specificity of some inputs combined to make this sector highly war vulnerable.
The agricultural subsistence sector was placed in a better position despite its seeming
resemblance to the cash crop sector. Bare land by itself is unlikely to be attacked but
fields may have been burned and livestock killed, as indicated above. Seeds benefited
from being storable, concealable and edible by their producers if necessary.
Subsistence agriculture, while the target of many attacks, was less war vulnerable
compared to cash crop agriculture as it depended on very localised purchases and
sales and thus local transport, if any. While this may be detrimental to objectives of
rural development, it contributed to the subsistence sector being marginally more
protected from the war by the nature of its activities than was the export-oriented
sector. This does not imply, of course, that the countryside did not suffer a high war
burden particularly in human costs (it did) but that some economic activities in the
countryside were less affected than others. On the other hand, many people were
forced into extreme forms of self-reliance as the war destroyed all other forms of
survival. Given the war situation, subsistence agriculture was therefore an enforced
alternative for previously fortunate producers of cash crops, a deliberate choice of
survival activity for some peasants, and an unattainable means of survival for a large
group of landless labourers and refugees.
The aim of destabilisation included the destruction of nearly every concrete building in
rural Renamo territories, mainly government facilities. Yet local construction inputs
(and thus simple houses) could be obtained at little cost and were considered less of aQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 39
target and thus less war vulnerable. Urban areas were quite safe from attacks. The
government sector was always war vulnerable as a major target, but the main
government activities were concentrated in the safer areas. Generally, one could say
that formal sector activity was more war vulnerable (especially to increases in
transaction costs) and the formal tradable sector more so than the formal non-tradable
sector.
Investment responds to the relative war vulnerability of assets, activities and sectors.
War vulnerability will decrease the desired capital stock K* hence reducing actual
investment as can be seen in equation (2). While it is difficult to measure domestic
investment, foreign direct investment (FDI) is more readily quantifiable. The
Mozambican government regulates FDI through an agency called Centro de Promoção
do Investimento Estrangeiro, CPI, for most sectors except minerals and commerce. The
CPI data of table 5 indicates annual FDI of about 30 million US dollars, 1985-93. As it is
difficult to confirm if investments have been undertaken, actual annual FDI has been
estimated conservatively at about 12 million US dollars by CPI. This is a very low
value which must have been determined, at least partly, by the war. In comparison, in
the post-war period, mid-1993 to end-1994, 442.8 million US dollars worth of FDI were
approved by CPI under the new investment legislation. This is equivalent to over two-
thirds of the sum approved in the previous eight years. Furthermore, the investments
cancelled or pending at the time of the survey were much reduced in the post-war
period.
Table 5: Foreign Direct Investment










Active/Realized 165.6 26.8% 40 9.0%
Being Implemented 62.8 10.2% 217.1 49.0%
Implementation
not Started
22.5 3.6% 158.2 35.7%
Cancelled/Pending 366.5 59.4% 27.6 6.2%
Total Approved 617.4 100% 442.8 100%
Source: CPI, Unpublished Data, August 1995.
Human capital also suffered erosion, destruction and reallocation.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 40
Table 6 shows the destruction and erosion of primary schools at an average annual rate
of about 6% for the years 1983-91. A similar destruction of hospitals and health posts
occurred in rural areas (Cliff and Noormahomed, 1988). The subsequent effect on the
quality of human capital is not measurable but will be evident.
Table 6: Destruction in the Education Sector
Primary Schools (Grades 1 to 5)
Closed or Destroyed







Total Number of Primary
Schools in 1983 5886 100.0
Source: Ministério da Educação, pp. 7-8, October 1994.
Frequently, people subjected to hostilities became displaced either within their
municipalities, within Mozambique or internationally. Table 7 indicates that war-
induced population flows increased in the late 1980s. About a quarter of all domestic
residents (excluding international refugees) were displaced within Mozambique at the
end of the war, a further 10% were international refugees and an unknown number of
Mozambicans, although they remained near their usual residence, had their
livelihoods destroyed by the war. These figures suggest three things at least. First, the
extent of the displacement of human capital in Mozambique was extreme, only
comparable to few other population movements following genocide in recent world
history. Second, such migration pattern must have been caused both by extreme
security and by dire economic concerns of the individuals involved. Third, such level
of migration will in turn cause unprecedented higher levels of uncertainty, transaction
costs and increased claims on fiscal and aid resources.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 41
Table 7: Estimated Displaced and Refugee Population
Sept. 1986 mid 1989 Oct. 1992























c 250 000 1 000 000 1 390 000
Total Displaced and
Refugees
na 2 689 492 5 118 000
Total Displaced, Affected
and Refugees
3 732 626 5 563 449 na
a  affected persons are defined as those whose homes or livelihoods have been destroyed but have not fled the area
b displaced persons are defined as those who have moved internally
c data for refugees refers only to those persons living in neighbouring countries with 1986 and 1989 data restricted to
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe
Sources: 1989 and 1986 data: World Bank, p. 67, October 1990; 1986 population
estimates: CNP, April 1987; 1992 data: International Organisation for Migration, pp. 9-
11, April 1994; and: UNOHAC, pp. 8-9, September 1994.
Finally, table 8 presents some figures which are unlikely to have immediate economic
significance but further reinforce the profoundness of this type of shock, particularly
compared to natural disasters. It illustrates the psychological traumas experienced and
crimes committed by war-affected children. The persistence of the war shock is thus
likely to be more long-lived, at least in the minds of people, than adverse economic
shocks or natural disasters of a similar magnitude.
Table 8: War Experiences of 6 to 15 Year-Old Children from War-Affected Areas
War Experience Percentage
witnessed physical abuse and/or  torture 88%
witnessed killings 77%
served as porters for Renamo 75%
were abducted from their families 64%
witnessed rape or sexual abuse 63%
were physically abused or tortured 51%
witnessed family members killed 37%
were trained for combat 28%
admitted to being raped 16%
admitted to killing 9%
suffered permanent physical injury 7%
Sample consisted of 504 children between the ages of 6 to 15 at the time of their
war experiences, originating from 7 different provinces, all of whom had been
resident in war-affected areas. Data collected between 1989-1990.
Source: Boothby et al, p. 21, 1991.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 42
5.2  Transactions Efficiency
The war-related reduction in transactions efficiency is the most difficult to estimate.
Some proxies for this effect include domestic marketing activity and transport costs.
Table 9 lists the net changes in numbers of operational units for a variety of structures
(buildings and some mobile marketing units). Warehouses, shops and trading posts
may have been abandoned due to insecurity, eroded in value, or completely destroyed.
The net decrease for all structures in the period 1982-88 was approximately 30%,
suggesting a net annual loss rate of about 5%.
Table 9: Commercial Network for Agricultural Marketing
Numbers of Establishments Nationally % Change
Commercial Structure 1982 1985 1988 1982-1988
Private Shops 3582 2452 2187 -39%
Agricom Fixed Posts 235 150 62 -74%
Other Fixed Posts 393 94 99 -75%
All Other Structures 882 1230 1226 39%
Total Commercial
Structures 5092 3926 3574 -30%
Source: World Bank, p. 142, October 1990.
Another proxy for transactions inefficiency focuses on increases in distribution costs
both due to insecurity (requiring protection and reducing load factors due to co-
ordination problems) and due to the reduced quality of transport infrastructure
(reducing travel speeds and increasing breakdowns on rough or mined roads). Figure
5 shows distribution costs as a percentage of costs for the two largest export and
subsistence crops (by weight) in 1989, under several security and transport scenarios.
Distribution costs contribute a much larger share of total costs for export costs than for
domestic consumption crops (as discussed above). The potential savings from security
improvements are much larger than the improvements from transport infrastructure.
For cashew, the largest by total volume and most valuable Mozambican export crop,
distribution costs halve as one moves from war (with well protected distribution) to
peace time and improved transport infrastructure. Thus war imposes a tax on output
which affects cash-crops relatively more than other crops.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 43
Figure 5: Distribution Costs in the War Economy
Source: World Bank, pp. 75-76, October 1989.
5.3  Uncertainty
The Mozambican government was able to build up its legitimacy in the course of the
war thus reducing war uncertainty over time. The government went through
successive stages of war uncertainty from chaotic times at independence to a newly
established authority soon afterwards, to then being a legitimate but threatened
authority (by Renamo) and finally to becoming the fully legitimate authority (see table
10). Thus at the macro level state uncertainty declined in the course of the war but it
was significant throughout this period. This would mainly have effects on the
reallocation of capital and transactions inefficiency and be reflected in, for example,
investment and population movements. Further macro-uncertainty would have been
created by government spending as analysed below.














































































scenario A: 1989 Mozambican situation with dedicated security force protection
scenario B: actual 1989 Mozambican situation
scenario C: same as B but with improved road transport infrastructure
scenario D: same as C but improved maritime transport and security improvements which would allow the
elimination of military escort (peace scenario)QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 44
At the micro-level, war of this type meant that civilians as well as soldiers faced
increased risks of mortality, that is an increased parameter p. Figure 6 plots the
national trend for average mortality rates (for all ages) and compares it to mortality
rates calculated in surveys of directly war-affected populations in several provinces
over various years. While the national mortality rate did not increase during the war
years, directly war-affected people could face mortality rates 3.5 to 7 times the national
average (that is their p increased up to seven-fold). The change is unlike the
destruction of physical or qualitative human capital, which will not return to the pre-
war levels as quickly but which was reduced by less.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 45



























































































































































































































Source: Cliff and Noormahomed, p. 720, 1988; CNP, pp. 21-31, May 1993.
Additional factors in the determination of mortality rates were the parallel occurrence
of famine and the offsetting provision of humanitarian assistance to cope with famine
and war. War, however, weakens the aid response to famine while famine may
intensify the struggle over the control of resources thus making both factors combined
more harmful than the individual components would suggest.
Finally, landmines obviously increase the risk of mutilation (eroding human capital in
part) or death in Mozambique (Roberts and Williams, 1995). Compared to the level of
atrocities committed, the impact of mines is likely to be lower in numbers of fatalQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 46
casualties during the war, particularly among people resident in areas at time of their
mining who hence know some of the unsafe areas (unlike refugees). Yet mines will
continue to destruct lives and keep land useless for years after the cease-fire thus
maintaining war uncertainty beyond the end of the formal conflict.
5.4  Fiscal Deficit
Three important aspects of public finance are tax revenue, government spending and
the net fiscal deficit. Foreign aid in addition may relax the fiscal constraint. Given the
structure of the war in Mozambique, one would expect either declining tax revenues or
increased tax rates and an attempt to expand the tax base. In fact, the data presented in
table A.1 (which contains all relevant data on the fiscal situation) and in figure 7a
indicates that the real value of total tax revenues fell by half 1981-85 (and by almost
two-thirds on a per capita basis 1982-85). Only with the start of adjustment in 1985 did
revenues rise again, possibly due to increased formal market activity (an implicit
widening of the tax base) but it did not attain previous levels. Nevertheless, tax
revenue as a proportion of GDP started to decline again in the early 1990s, perhaps
because the structural adjustment programmes only represented a one-off
improvement but yielded no long-term growth in revenues.
Figure 7: Summary of Fiscal Variables
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Net External Borrowing (D2)
Net Domestic Financing (D3) 
Similarly, tax revenue rose in relative importance to non-tax revenue after the
introduction of economic reforms which took effect about 1986 (table A.1 and figure
7b). Yet tax revenue was eclipsed by external grants in 1992 when they were worth
21.1% and 22.1% of GDP, respectively. In the last 6 years of the war, 1987-92, this ratio
averaged 16.4% of GDP for grants, showing their relative importance in financing theQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 48
war economy. The relation of tax revenue to external borrowing was more volatile,
both being determined by war conditions. Overall, tax revenue declined in the early
1980s but recovered partially in the years of structural adjustment. The composition of
tax revenues was affected by the war and both non-tax revenue and grants became
relatively more important as expected.
Overall spending was volatile (figure 7c). It peaked in 1982, fell until 1985 and rose
until 1988 when it stabilised at an historically high level. With such fluctuations, it is
hard to characterise G as continuously rising. Yet given the post-1985 recovery in
spending, the trend pointed upwards in most years and G certainly rose relative to T
up to 1988.
For government spending, one would predict war spending GW to increase and
perhaps also GH as it allows the government to gain popular support. Economically
productive expenditure such as GL and GP on the other hand are likely to be squeezed.
GW more than doubled in real terms 1980-94, rose by almost nine points as a
percentage of G 1980-85, and increased by 86% as a share of GDP 1980-87 (figure 7d).
Note that until 1980, Mozambican security was threatened by Rhodesia so that the
level of GW was already high at that time while the post-war levels include costs of
demobilisation, a long-term, peace-time cost of war. Yet GW was also very volatile
supporting the view that government spending contributes towards uncertainty in the
economy either directly (through fighting) or indirectly (by e.g. raising demand or
causing inflation).
GH (defined as the salaries, wages, goods and services component of current
expenditure) first declined by 60% but recovered after 1987 (figure 7e). Yet it declined
relative to other expenditures and as a share of GDP for most of the 1980s (figure 7f).
Hence the government was either not willing or unable to expand this type of
spending in the early war years, when aid finance was not yet widely available.
Economically productive spending (that is real public investment expenditure) fell to a
fifth of its peak 1982 value in only three years (figure 7g) while it also decreased
strongly relative to other expenditures and as a proportion of GDP (figure 7h). Later,
aid inflows permitted the resumption of public investment activity at higher level. The
components of government spending therefore changed as expected under warQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 49
conditions (increases in GW and falling other expenditures) especially in the first half of
the 1980s.
The fiscal deficit increased every year, except during 1985 and twice in the 1990s when
the real deficit was almost unchanged (figure 7i). As a proportion of GDP, the deficit
more than doubled in the four years to 1984 and trebled 1980-90 thus putting much
strain on the domestic economy. Initially, domestic financing accounted for much of
the deficit but with increased adjustment its role declined. External financing initially
was also high but started to fall prior to adjustment. The renewed decline in external
borrowing was presumably supply-determined through credit-rationing. These two
observations suggest an important result, namely that Mozambique was forced into
structural adjustment as a result of the burden of war finance. With little Eastern bloc
support forthcoming and finding it difficult to mobilise domestic resources, the
government could not afford to self-finance both the war and Mozambique’s
development.
The one exception to this rule were grants. The turn from Eastern bloc support to the
West facilitated a significant inflow of financial resources in support of the
government. Grants increased from 2-3% to about a fifth of GDP in the early 1990s
(figure 7j). In fact, grants were equivalent in value to government revenue, 1992-94. In
the early war years, non-project grants to the government actually declined as a
relative share of the deficit and, for several years, in real terms, while project-grants
were the more common type of grant post-1986 (figure 7k). The order of importance
for three types of funding of the budget deficit changed from domestic financing,
external borrowing and grants (in declining order) in the mid-1980s to the inverse in
the late-1980s and 1990s (figure 7l).
Yet the timing of the increase and the composition of the grants suggest that foreign
aid is determined by factors other than war as well. Aid for general use of the
government is supplied even in times of war but that specific aid is more readily
provided by donors in an era of adjustment. Furthermore, aid in Mozambique was
delivered on humanitarian grounds in times of famine or for general development
purposes but not explicitly to support the war effort. Mozambique continued to attract
much aid throughout the years of its internal war but not primarily because of the war.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 50
Aid in Mozambique should thus be seen as a variable independent from the war,
though of great importance in maintaining government expenditure patterns and
levels.
5.5  Output
The empirical testing of the macroeconomic model will focus on the five predictions
concerning output, growth, consumption, welfare and government debt. Prediction 5
stated a decline in output resulting from capital destruction, transactions inefficiency
and increased uncertainty, all of which took place in Mozambique. The measures used
as proxies for output are gross domestic product (GDP) and global social product
(GSP). While calculated according to different methodologies, both series show similar
patterns thus allowing comparisons over time. As the dynamic model is standardised
for the size of the population, per capita (pc) measures are used throughout. Data is
expressed in constant 1980 prices (cp) using the GDP deflator and is calculated as an
index (1980 values being set to 100) so that comparisons in trends can be made readily.
Figure 8: Summary of Output, Consumption and Debt Variables
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The data presented in table A.2 and in figures 8a-b show that both measures of output
declined until 1986/87. While GSP pc fell more steeply and more continuously, both
measures indicate a drastic decline of about 30-40% in output in the early and mid-
1980s. The GSP data available for the mid-1970s shows output also fell over a third
after decolonisation. Such a political shock may have long-term effects akin to war
(especially due to a reduction of human capital) but the increase in output by about
17% during 1975-81 indicates that the decolonisation shock was at least partially
overcome when the war intensified in the early 1980s. This is related to the one-off
nature of decolonisation which implied expectations could adjust to the new regime
(though that may have been creating uncertainties of its own). The expectation of an
independence dividend was therefore more realistic in 1975 than was the expectation
of a peace dividend in 1992.
However, the rise of measured output in the late 1980s indicated that war was not the
only relevant factor determining output in those years. Instead, the positive effects of
the reform projects and the related inflow of aid allowed an expansion of output
despite the continuous destruction of capital. The war shock became relatively less
important as some war variables acted in a one-off fashion. Uncertainty over life
spans, for instance, would have shifted up to a higher level for each war zone butQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 52
would not typically increase further thereafter. Capital destruction in some areas was
nearly complete while the destruction of capital elsewhere was being offset by aid
inflows (thus preventing a further fall in consumption, see below). Arguably the
productive capacity was not being maintained during the war. That is, increases in
output were not achieved on a sustainable basis of domestically generated savings
turned into investment but growth instead depended on an exogenously determined
level of foreign aid inflows. This view of Mozambique living on a life-support machine
of aid during the war years is further supported by the above evidence on the level of
aid supporting the fiscal deficit of the government. Overall, prediction 5 is thus
supported by the evidence: Output in this war economy fell, especially before 1988.
5.6  Growth
Prediction 6 states that war will reduce the long-term growth rate of the economy
(beyond the initial reduction in output). This is in contradiction to the prediction
derived from a reduction in capital only. The result is brought about by the joint effects
of transactions efficiency and uncertainty on the war economy. Testing this claim is
difficult since growth of output is likely to fluctuate strongly and unlikely to show a
clear long-term trend.
The actual growth rates of GDP and GSP indicate such strong yearly fluctuations
(figure 8c). Yet the GDP series shows a small trend: While practically all pre-1988 rates
are below zero, most values thereafter lie near or above zero percent growth. A
possible interpretation is that the war reduced the growth rates initially, the
adjustment programmes helped improve this rate but the internal war prevented a
growth rate allowing a catch-up with hypothetical peace-time values, as argued above.
Therefore , the case of Mozambique gives support to the view that war damages the
growth potential beyond the period of the capital destruction. However, the number of
other factors influencing the economy in these years and the fact that a long-term post-
war data series is not yet available, make this prediction hard to prove.
5.7  Consumption
Prediction 7 states that consumption will fall in a war economy. The levels of constant-
price per capita private consumption declined for the first six years of the period
covered in table A.2 and figure 8d before rising slightly for three years and falling toQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 53
nearly half of its 1980 value by 1994. Interestingly, government consumption fell
relatively more than private consumption initially and benefited more from the aid
inflows as it increased relatively more in the later years (figure 8e). This shows the
responsiveness of the composition of government expenditure to the war situation and
the importance of external finance (including aid) for the government’s budget
constraint as seen in equation (6).
Another interesting fact is highlighted by the relation of consumption to GDP. The
dynamic theory predicts that a one-off reduction in capital will lead to a curtailment of
consumption so that additional investment may rebuild the capital stock. Yet
prediction may not hold for a more complex shock as war will also reduce the ability
of the economy to rebuild itself, hence further decreasing output. In fact, both
consumption and output fell strongly in the first half of the 1980s but relatively
speaking private consumption fell by less till 1987 (figure 8f).
Before 1987, the prospect of on-going warfare and corresponding capital destruction
hence forced people into involuntary consumption. Alternatively, as mentioned above,
people were so close to their survival threshold that their propensity to consume
actually increased with declining incomes. Furthermore, the accumulation of a war-
related budget deficit has an impact on the long-term welfare of the population yet
some parts of the current population in the early 1980s may not have found their
consumption to be affected thus maintaining relatively higher levels of consumption
than output. Finally, the increased share of consumption will eventually lead to a
further reduction of output as it reduced the resources available for future growth thus
making some of the reversal in the relative change of these two variables inevitable.
After 1987, the higher growth of output could be either due to foreign aid or due to
structural adjustment. It is doubtful that aid generally and the composition of aid to
Mozambique particularly would have permitted growth in output as witnessed post-
1987. Instead, aid allowed a maintenance of consumption for some of the most
threatened victims of war and famine, and it helped to sustain the level of public
consumption from 1988 onwards. Structural adjustment on the other hand increased
the prospect of employing resources more efficiently thus encouraging non-
consumption activities and thereby reversing the involuntary increase in the MPCQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 54
with declining income. Furthermore, the rural sectors and its population suffered a
greater deal from the war while the urban sectors benefited more from the market
oriented policy reforms. Hence productivity gains in the late 1980s were achieved in
the towns, where economic data collection was superior as well, while consumption
decreases were incurred by the large share of the population living in the countryside.
This is a strong indication of the duality of the war economy in Mozambique where
the war was removed from some of the productive sectors of the economy hence
causing asymmetries in the development of the economy and possibly the society as
well.
Overall, the evidence supports the prediction that total private consumption per capita
decreased as a result of the war. However, consumption did not fall by as much as
output until 1987 reflecting the behaviour of individual consumption near the survival
threshold. After 1987, reform-oriented policies assisted a recovery of output in the
safer, mainly urban areas.
5.8  Welfare
Given that prediction 8 states that war reduces welfare, it is important to consider
proxies for welfare. The most common one is GDP per capita, which fell drastically as
a consequence of war (table A.2). Social indicators such as malnutrition, infant
mortality and literacy rates provide more detailed impressions on some aspects of
welfare. Already, it was shown that education sector suffered capital major losses
(table 6), that mortality rates in war areas increased sharply (figure 6), and that huge
proportions of the population were displaced (table 7) or even directly affected by the
terror of the war (table 8). The difficulty with these concepts lies in collection and
measurement problems particularly under war conditions and in a country where 95%
of its population have been estimated to be poor with over two-thirds considered
absolutely poor (World Bank, October 1990). Poverty in this context includes the
inability to collect and evaluate data, due to a lack of capacity, due to other, more
pressing spending priorities, and due to the insecurity and fluctuation inherent in the
war situation. The lack of data on social variables is therefore another cost of this
conflict. Yet it is clear from the evidence available that welfare did decline significantly
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5.9  Debt
Finally prediction 9 states that the government debt will increase in times of war.
Given the constraints on the domestic financial market (including its small size, lack of
financial institutions, inflation, uncertainty and its lack of credibility), most
government borrowing had to come from foreign sources. The total foreign debt stock
increased continuously to 500% of GDP after it became possible for the Mozambican
government to borrow abroad in 1985 (figure 8g). This is a reflection of the fiscal
deficits accumulated over the war years and reflects both the need for increased war
spending and the reduced ability of the government to generate tax revenue
domestically in times of war. Prediction 9 is therefore applicable in the case of
Mozambique.
6.  Policy Considerations and Conclusions
The case of Mozambique provides some clear conclusions concerning the
macroeconomic effects of war. One, war leads to lower output and growth, as
predicted. The actual magnitudes of these variables are strongly influenced by other
economic factors, such as decolonisation, government policies and structural
adjustment. War does not permit a quick restoration of output if it causes more than
one-off capital destruction. The effects of government debt, uncertainty and
transactions inefficiency further undermine the economy. In fact, while aid inflows
permit some output growth, the ongoing war (and hence uncertainty and transactions
inefficiency) prevent sustainable development. The evidence presented here supports
the view that war can potentially undermine the capacity of an economy to initiate and
support long-term development.
Two, there was an initial increase in private consumption relative to output, followed
by a sharp recovery of output and falling consumption. This suggests that the
behaviour of very poor agents in a war economy is affected by their immediate
concern for survival, thus placing a premium on short-term consumption at the
expense of savings and investment. The breakdown of market activity under war
conditions (as illustrated by the implications of the Gersovitz model on the annuity
market) will reinforce increases in inefficient survival activities. On the other hand,
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produce some growth. However, the benefit of such growth to those directly suffering
a war burden is doubtful. These people may rather benefit from consumption-oriented
foreign aid, which at least maintains their basic needs.
Three, the budget constraint of a war-time government is particularly tight: Receipts
are likely to be low and spending needs high. Deliberate inflation or taxation lead to
incentive problems, create distortions and impose a heavy war burden on the
economy. The obvious solution is therefore for a developing country to use foreign
borrowing and aid to finance its war-time spending plans. Aid in particular will
permit high consumption levels in the short term.
Four, government war taxation involves an extraction of resources from the population
thus reducing their welfare in the long-term. Hence, war decreases welfare through
four channels: The loss of capital through enemy action, the inefficient use and
destruction of the resources extracted by the government, the long-term debt burden of
war finance, and the negative effects of uncertainty and transactions inefficiency on
the capacity to raise current and future output.
Five, aid can extend the government’s budgetary constraints significantly. Yet there is
a price for turning to donors for help. Mozambique was driven by its dire budgetary
and growth position of the mid 1980s to seek support from the IMF and the World
Bank. In exchange for aid and financial lending the government had to accept
structural adjustment and liberalisation policies which in turn placed much emphasis
on complying with strict financial standards. By 1992, the government had exhausted
all domestic and external resources for financing core governmental functions and the
war. Therefore, both the government and Renamo needed to seek an end to the war for
lack of further resources. This framework of analysing the war from an economic point
of view hence explains endogenously the end of the war itself. However, this also
implies that the provision of resources by donors may lead to a temporary
continuation of the war. Donors should use their influence to express a preference for
humanitarian over military government expenditure and to work towards resolving
the socio-economic issues underlying the conflict in the receiving country. Given a
strong dependence of a war economy on external support, there exists a powerful lever
for forcing the warring parties out of the conflict. It appears as if Mozambique hadQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 57
been allowed to continue its war without very strong efforts on the side of the donor
community to use this lever. It is doubtful that Mozambique benefited in any way
from this absence of strong outside leadership.
Finally, these conclusions suggest that war forces the economy into a state of
diminished competitiveness. The benchmark of perfect competition in economic
analysis entails a number of restrictive assumptions such as certainty, full information,
no transport costs, and enforceable property rights. In times of war, however, all of
these assumptions need to be relaxed much more than in times of peace. While natural
disasters may only require the rebuilding of the capital stock, war differs from this and
most other economic shocks in that it requires the reconstruction of physical as well as
abstract forms of capital. The latter may entail rebuilding confidence, certainty,
information flows, government fairness and efficient civil administration. A key
conclusion of this analysis is therefore that capital destruction may be easier to
overcome and less of an obstacle to development than the war-induced destruction of
transactions efficiency and certainty. This explains the absence to date of a strong
peace-dividend in post-war Mozambique.
Another key conclusion of this analysis is that the government and donors are clearly
able to lessen these negative effects of war. Policies should aim, first, to reduce fighting
and thus the war vulnerability of capital, secondly, to reduce the scale of the inefficient
use of resources by the government, thirdly, to provide financial resources other than
debt to support government expenditure in times of war, and fourthly, to maintain
certainty, confidence and the level of transactions efficiency throughout the time of
war. Such measures include protecting civil administrative institutions, credibility and
efficiency and the reduction of the war vulnerability of people, capital, and activities.
These policies will protect private sector activity first in the less war-vulnerable sectors
of the war economy and subsequently in the whole post-war economy. In short, the
potential for sustained post-war reconstruction is dependent on the policies adopted
during the war. Reducing the costs of war and facilitating sustainable development are
equivalent from this point of view.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 58
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Appendix
Table A.1: Fiscal Variables
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
T-Total Tax Revenue 15356 18408 21051 16500 13894 8038 8503 10638 13815 17156 16470 17853 17229 19439 18000
   T per capita (Mt) 1266 1479 1648 1258 1033 582 600 754 994 1225 1156 1238 1165 1247 1083
   T as % of GDP  19.6% 23.2% 27.8% 25.0% 20.5% 13.1% 13.6% 17.6% 20.8% 22.9% 22.2% 21.7% 21.1% 20.0% 17.6%
T1-Tax Revenue 12003 12402 12296 11518 10078 5589 6069 9022 11649 15135 14723 15166 14964 17702 16484
T2-Nontax Revenue 3353 6006 8755 4982 3816 2449 2434 1616 2166 2022 1747 2687 2265 1736 1516
   (T1) / (T2) 3.6 2.1 1.4 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.5 5.6 5.4 7.5 8.4 5.6 6.6 10.2 10.9
   (T1) / (D1) 5.7 6.9 6.4 5.4 5.6 4.4 4.1 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.8
   (T1) / (D2) 5.1 2.7 2.8 2.3 3.4 2.6 2.8 1.8 1.8 2.5 1.6 3.0 5.0 4.9 1.8
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
G-Total Expenditure  22892 27833 30609 29747 27874 16609 19362 24402 31641 35758 38121 38266 38995 40993 48331
   G per capita (Mt) 1887 2236 2396 2269 2072 1203 1366 1731 2276 2554 2675 2654 2637 2631 2909
   G as % of GDP 29.3% 35.1% 40.5% 45.1% 41.0% 27.0% 30.9% 40.3% 47.6% 47.7% 51.5% 46.6% 47.9% 42.3% 47.3%
   (G) / (T) 149% 151% 145% 180% 201% 207% 228% 229% 229% 208% 231% 214% 226% 211% 268%
G1-Current Expenditure 14172 16248 17889 18851 17461 13815 15887 13940 15666 18624 18928 18264 19931 20764 23336
    G1 as % of G 61.9% 58.4% 58.4% 63.4% 62.6% 83.2% 82.1% 57.1% 49.5% 52.1% 49.7% 47.7% 51.1% 50.7% 48.3%
    G1 as % of GDP  18.1% 20.5% 23.7% 28.6% 25.7% 22.4% 25.4% 23.0% 23.6% 24.8% 25.5% 22.2% 24.5% 21.4% 22.9%
   Defense and Security 4419 5590 5684 6012 6426 4631 4665 6415 6125 7753 7516 7108 6758 7415 8990
       D & S per capita (Mt) 364 449 445 459 478 335 329 455 441 554 527 493 457 476 541
       D & S as % of G 19.3% 20.1% 18.6% 20.2% 23.1% 27.9% 24.1% 26.3% 19.4% 21.7% 19.7% 18.6% 17.3% 18.1% 18.6%
       D & S as % of GDP 5.7% 7.0% 7.5% 9.1% 9.5% 7.5% 7.5% 10.6% 9.2% 10.3% 10.1% 8.7% 8.3% 7.6% 8.8%
   Salaries and Wages 5112 5637 5314 5201 4483 3191 3019 2308 2613 3254 3592 4033 3714 4249 3890
       S & W as % of G 22.3% 20.3% 17.4% 17.5% 16.1% 19.2% 15.6% 9.5% 8.3% 9.1% 9.4% 10.5% 9.5% 10.4% 8.0%
       S & W as % of GDP 6.5% 7.1% 7.0% 7.9% 6.6% 5.2% 4.8% 3.8% 3.9% 4.3% 4.8% 4.9% 4.6% 4.4% 3.8%
   Goods and Services 3605 4281 3883 3492 2498 1803 1884 1954 2748 3204 3426 3578 4493 4092 7100
       G & S as % of G 15.7% 15.4% 12.7% 11.7% 9.0% 10.9% 9.7% 8.0% 8.7% 9.0% 9.0% 9.3% 11.5% 10.0% 14.7%
       G & S  as % of GDP 4.6% 5.4% 5.1% 5.3% 3.7% 2.9% 3.0% 3.2% 4.1% 4.3% 4.6% 4.4% 5.5% 4.2% 7.0%
   S&W and G&S  8717 9918 9197 8692 6981 4994 4903 4262 5360 6458 7019 7611 8208 8341 10990
       S&W and G&S as a % of G 38.1% 35.6% 30.0% 29.2% 25.0% 30.1% 25.3% 17.5% 16.9% 18.1% 18.4% 19.9% 21.0% 20.3% 22.7%
       S&W and G&S as a % of GDP 11.1% 12.5% 12.2% 13.2% 10.3% 8.1% 7.8% 7.0% 8.1% 8.6% 9.5% 9.3% 10.1% 8.6% 10.8%
   Interest on Public Debt 5 6 7 35 32 38 299 1274 1619 2324 2470 1845 3130 3523 1776
       Interest as % of G 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 1.5% 5.2% 5.1% 6.5% 6.5% 4.8% 8.0% 8.6% 3.7%
       Interest as % of GDP 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 2.1% 2.4% 3.1% 3.3% 2.2% 3.8% 3.6% 1.7%
G2-Investment, Budget Year 8720 11584 12720 10897 10413 2794 3474 10462 14712 16225 17922 19602 19653 21786 28411
    G2 as % of Total Expenditure (G) 38.1% 41.6% 41.6% 36.6% 37.4% 16.8% 17.9% 42.9% 46.5% 45.4% 47.0% 51.2% 50.4% 53.1% 58.8%
    G2 as % of GDP  11.2% 14.6% 16.8% 16.5% 15.3% 4.5% 5.6% 17.3% 22.1% 21.6% 24.2% 23.9% 24.1% 22.5% 27.8%
G3-Enterprise Debt Liquidation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1263 909 1271 1438 975 712 0
    G3 as % of Total Exenditure (G) 0.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4.0% 2.5% 3.3% 3.8% 2.5% 1.7% 0.0%
    G3 as % of GDP 0.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.9% 1.2% 1.7% 1.8% 1.2% 0.7% 0.0%QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 62
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
D-Total Deficit 7536 9425 9558 13247 13980 8571 10859 13764 17826 18602 21651 20413 21766 21554 30331
    D per capita (Mt) 621 757 748 1010 1039 621 766 976 1282 1329 1519 1416 1472 1383 1826
    D as % of GDP 9.6% 11.9% 12.6% 20.1% 20.6% 13.9% 17.3% 22.7% 26.8% 24.8% 29.2% 24.9% 26.7% 22.2% 29.7%
D1-Grants Received 2095 1793 1919 2148 1806 1259 1469 6092 9667 12099 12506 15273 17984 16585 21912
    D1 as % of Total Deficit (D) 27.8% 19.0% 20.1% 16.2% 12.9% 14.7% 13.5% 44.3% 54.2% 65.0% 57.8% 74.8% 82.6% 76.9% 72.2%
    D1 as % of Total Revenue (T) 13.6% 9.7% 9.1% 13.0% 13.0% 15.7% 17.3% 57.3% 70.0% 70.5% 75.9% 85.6% 104.4% 85.3% 121.7%
    D1 as % of GDP  2.7% 2.3% 2.5% 3.3% 2.7% 2.0% 2.3% 10.1% 14.5% 16.1% 16.9% 18.6% 22.1% 17.1% 21.5%
   Project Grants (P) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4661 5089 7321 7002 9444 9018 10283 12428
       P as % of Total Deficit (D) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33.9% 28.5% 39.4% 32.3% 46.3% 41.4% 47.7% 41.0%
       P as % of GDP 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7.7% 7.7% 9.8% 9.5% 11.5% 11.1% 10.6% 12.2%
   Non-Project Grants (N-P) 2095 1793 1919 2148 1806 1259 1469 1431 4578 4777 5504 5830 8966 6302 9496
       N-P as % of Total Deficit (D) 27.8% 19.0% 20.1% 16.2% 12.9% 14.7% 13.5% 10.4% 25.7% 25.7% 25.4% 28.6% 41.2% 29.2% 31.3%
       N-P as % of GDP 2.7% 2.3% 2.5% 3.3% 2.7% 2.0% 2.3% 2.4% 6.9% 6.4% 7.4% 7.1% 11.0% 6.5% 9.3%
D2-External Borrowing (net) 2375 4578 4444 4995 2943 2149 2205 5123 6486 6171 9312 5099 3021 3631 9300
   D2 as % of Total Deficit (D) 31.5% 48.6% 46.5% 37.7% 21.1% 25.1% 20.3% 37.2% 36.4% 33.2% 43.0% 25.0% 13.9% 16.8% 30.7%
   D2 as % of GDP 3.0% 5.8% 5.9% 7.6% 4.3% 3.5% 3.5% 8.5% 9.8% 8.2% 12.6% 6.2% 3.7% 3.7% 9.1%
D3-Domestic Financing (net)  3066 3054 3196 9901 5264 5162 7389 2569 1379 121 22 36 1754 1338 -882
   D3 as % of Total Deficit (D) 40.7% 32.4% 33.4% 74.7% 37.7% 60.2% 68.1% 18.7% 7.7% 0.7% 0.1% 0.2% 8.1% 6.2% -2.9%
   D3 as % of GDP 3.9% 3.8% 4.2% 15.0% 7.7% 8.4% 11.8% 4.2% 2.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 1.4% -0.9%
Basic Data
Total Resident Population (in '000) 12130 12449 12776 13112 13456 13810 14174 14100 13900 14000 14252 14420 14790 15583 16614
GDP Deflator 100.0 102.7 122.2 138.5 160.6 238.2 266.6 650.0 949.8 1320.8 1809.5 2504.3 3836.7 5620.7 8476.0
Exchange Rate (Mt/US$,  end of year) 33.8 35.8 37.8 40.2 42.4 43.2 39.7 289.4 528.6 819.7 1038.2 1845.4 2742.1 5238.4 6552.5
Notes
Sources: CNP, Anuario Estatistico, various years; World Bank, October 1990.  All data is expressed in  million Meticais, per calendar year and in constant 1980 prices, unless otherwise stated. 1994 data are estimates. 
Compatible information for the pre-1980 period is not available. Only a select breakdown for current expenditure is shown.   Domestic financing mainly includes subsides to loss making entreprises before 1987. QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS11 63
Table A.2: Output, Consumption and Debt Variables
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Output & Growth
GDP, cp (bn Mt)  78.2 79.4 75.6 66.0 67.9 61.5 62.6 60.5 66.5 75.0 74.1 82.1 81.5 97.0 102.1
    GDP, % change na 1.5% -4.7% -12.7% 2.9% -9.4% 1.7% -3.3% 9.8% 12.9% -1.2% 10.8% -0.8% 19.1% 5.2%
    GDP per capita, cp (Mt) 6447 6375 5918 5033 5048 4457 4417 4291 4781 5358 5236 5694 5509 6226 6144
    GDP per capita, % change na -1.1% -7.2% -15.0% 0.3% -11.7% -0.9% -2.8% 11.4% 12.1% -2.3% 8.8% -3.3% 13.0% -1.3%
    Index: GDP per capita, cp 100.0 98.9 91.8 78.1 78.3 69.1 68.5 66.6 74.2 83.1 81.2 88.3 85.4 96.6 95.3
GSP, cp (bn Mt)  82.1 84.1 78.8 64.4 58.2 53.9 55.0 56.7 60.2 62.4 na na na na na
    GSP, % change na 2.4% -6.3% -18.3% -9.6% -7.4% 2.0% 3.1% 6.2% 3.7% na na na na na
    GSP per capita, cp (Mt)  6768 6756 6168 4912 4325 3903 3880 4021 4331 4457 na na na na na
    GSP per capita, % change na -0.2% -8.7% -20.4% -11.9% -9.8% -0.6% 3.6% 7.7% 2.9% na na na na na
    Index: GSP per capita, cp 100.0 99.8 91.1 72.6 63.9 57.7 57.3 59.4 64.0 65.9 na na na na na
Consumption
Total Consumption, cp (bn Mt) 77.8 78.5 78.0 74.0 73.7 65.1 64.7 65.8 68.7 72.2 65.2 58.6 57.0 69.1 63.7
    Total Consumption per capita, cp (Mt) 6414 6307 6107 5642 5478 4714 4567 4666 4944 5159 4610 4062 3851 4432 3834
    Total Consumption as % of GDP 99% 99% 103% 112% 109% 106% 103% 109% 103% 96% 88% 71% 70% 71% 62%
    Index: Total Consumption per capita, cp 100.0 98.3 95.2 88.0 85.4 73.5 71.2 72.8 77.1 80.4 71.9 63.3 60.0 69.1 59.8
Private Consumption, cp (bn Mt) 64.0 62.5 62.6 58.4 59.4 55.1 54.5 56.4 58.4 59.7 53.4 46.3 44.5 55.8 48.8
    Private Consumption per capita, cp (Mt) 5276 5023 4898 4455 4413 3990 3844 4000 4200 4266 3776 3208 3007 3579 2940
    Private Consumption as % of GDP 82% 79% 83% 89% 87% 90% 87% 93% 88% 80% 72% 56% 55% 57% 48%
    Index: Private Consumption per capita, cp 100.0 95.2 92.8 84.4 83.6 75.6 72.9 75.8 79.6 80.9 71.6 60.8 57.0 67.8 55.7
Public Consumption, cp (bn Mt) 13.8 16.0 15.4 15.6 14.3 10.0 10.2 9.4 10.3 12.5 11.8 12.3 12.5 13.3 14.9
    Public Consumption per capita, cp (Mt) 1138 1285 1209 1188 1064 724 723 666 743 893 834 855 844 853 894
    Public Consumption as % of GDP 18% 20% 20% 24% 21% 16% 16% 16% 16% 17% 16% 15% 15% 14% 15%
    Index: Public Consumption per capita, cp 100.0 112.9 106.2 104.4 93.6 63.6 63.5 58.6 65.3 78.5 73.3 75.1 74.2 75.0 78.6
    Private as % of Public Consumption 464% 391% 405% 375% 415% 551% 532% 600% 565% 478% 453% 375% 356% 419% 329%
Foreign Debt
    Total Foreign Debt Stock, cp (bn Mt) na na na na na 50.7 47.1 173.6 234.3 272.5 284.5 368.1 360.3 467.0 na
    Total Foreign Debt Stock as % of GDP na na na na na 82% 75% 287% 353% 363% 384% 448% 442% 481% na
    Foreign Debt Stock per capita, cp (Mt) na na na na na 3668 3319 12311 16854 19467 20107 25524 24360 29970 na
Basic Data
    Total Resident Population (in '000) 12130 12449 12776 13112 13456 13810 14174 14100 13900 14000 14151 14420 14790 15583 16614
    GDP Deflator 100 103 122 139 161 238 267 650 950 1321 1809 2504 3837 5621 8476
    Consumer Price Index 100 104 122 137 157 232 261 719 1114 1559 2294 3070 4792 6883 11706
    Exchange Rate (Mt/US$, end of period) 32.8 35.8 37.8 40.2 42.4 43.2 39.7 289 529 820 1038 1845 2742 5238 6553
Notes
Sources: CNP, Anuarios and Informacao Estatisticas, various years; Banco de Mocambique, Boletim Estatistico, no 7, 1995; World Bank, December 1992; Ratilal,  1990.
Pre-1980 data is generally not available. The exceptions are GSP cp in bn Mt 111.9 (1973), 91.5 (1974), 71.4 (1975) and 75 (1977) and a population estimate for 1975 of 10627000.
All indices are set at 100 in 1980. cp=constant 1980 prices, mn=million; bn=billion; Mt=Meticais; na=not available/applicable.